Do Firms Endowed with Greater Strategic Capability Earn Higher Profits?
Field research has documented differences in firms' strategic capabilities as well as a profound link between capability and performance. For example, Goldfarb and Yang (2009) analyze the decisions of Internet service providers to offer their customers new services, finding considerable heterogeneity in the degree to which firms behave strategically; more strategic firms have higher profitability and an enhanced survival rate. Similarly, Goldfarb and Xiao (2011) find sizable variation in managers' strategic capabilities in the U.S. local telephone market. They show that managers with degrees in economics or business, as well as those who attended selective undergraduate institutions, display higher estimated levels of strategic ability. More strategic firms also achieved better results: they were more likely to survive and obtain higher revenues. Similarly, Che, Sudhir, and Seetharaman (2007) systematically evaluate whether boundedly rational firms indeed look ahead when they set prices and, if so, to what extent. The authors find that the observed retail prices are consistent with a pricing model in which both manufacturers and retailers are forward looking, but some firms have short time horizons when setting prices. Specifically, they look ahead by only one period, suggesting that firms are boundedly rational in their dynamic pricing behavior.
Heterogeneity in capabilities has also been evidenced in the experimental economics literature. McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) and McKelvey, Palfrey, and Weber (2000) show that differences in bounded rationality across players can better account for behavior in a collection of games. Camerer, Ho, and Chong (2004) propose a cognitive hierarchy (CH) model in which each boundedly rational player assumes his or her own strategy is the most sophisticated. They show that cognitively superior players exploit the poor decisions of their rivals and earn more profits in a variety of games.
Taken together, field and experimental research on bounded rationality has consistently found that players with greater strategic capability perform better in competition. In contrast, we aim to assess whether and when the opposite can be true: Is it theoretically possible for the less strategic players to achieve superior performance in a competition? If so, under what conditions will this happen? Answers to these questions can help generalize insights regarding the nature of strategic interactions in the context of limited capabilities (Ho, Lim, and Camerer 2006; Meyer et al. 2010) .
Building on the work of Varian (1980) and Narasimhan (1988) , this article considers price competition in the context of an oligopoly in which the market consists of some consumers who are loyal to a specific firm and others who are price sensitive and thus switch between brands on the basis of prices. We extend this research to incorporate asymmetric strategic capabilities among competing firms. Conventional wisdom suggests that firms with higher strategic capability will undercut their competitors' prices and earn more profits than their less sophisticated rivals. This conjecture is true when the loyal consumer group is small and firms compete aggressively for the price-sensitive consumers. However, firms with higher strategic capability can actually be less profitable than their less sophisticated rivals when the size of the price-sensitive segment is small. In this instance, strategic firms raise prices to capitalize on their loyal customers' higher willingness to pay, thereby directing a larger share of the price-sensitive consumers to the nonstrategic firms. This finding is robust to alternative formulations that allow for (1) several levels (vs. only two levels) of strategic thinking, (2) asymmetric strategies (vs. a symmetric strategy among strategic players), and (3) private knowledge (vs. common knowledge) about players' types. Notably, regardless of information about firm types, strategic firms in equilibrium will not mimic their less strategic counterparts, even though the nonstrategic firms earn higher profits. We generate empirical support for our theoretical findings in a laboratory setting that reflects the structure of the model. In this experiment, strategic firms charge higher prices and earn lower profits than their nonstrategic counterparts.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. We first introduce the model and analyze two cases of multi-firm pricing competition: one in which all the firms are strategic and the other in which firms differ in their strategic capabilities. Next, we present an alternative formulation of asymmetric strategic capabilities. In the following section, we discuss the experiment used to test the theoretical propositions. Subsequently, we extend the model to consider multiple nonstrategic firms and private information about player types, and we close with concluding thoughts. The Web Appendix presents the proofs.
MODEL AND EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS

Model
To explore the effect of limited strategic reasoning on firms' prices and profits in a competitive context, we consider an m-firm oligopoly model that parallels Narasimhan (1988) . Each of the m risk-neutral firms produces a horizontally differentiated product at a constant marginal cost, which we set to zero without loss of generality. The managers of the m firms have perfect foresight in that they correctly predict their rivals' pricing strategies. Furthermore, they best respond to their beliefs about competing firms. Thus, these managers come to play the Nash equilibrium through sheer introspection.
Each firm has a set of loyal consumers. These consumers purchase the firm's product, provided that the price is below their reservation value, and they cannot be induced to purchase any of the competing products. Denote the size of each firm's loyal segment by a. In addition to the loyal consumers, the market includes a set of switchers, who purchase the lowest-priced product if the price is below their reservation value. Let the size of the switching segment be b. The total market size is normalized to 1 so that ma + b = 1. Furthermore, the common reservation value is set to 1. Two types of firms exist in this market: strategic and nonstrategic. Strategic firms are endowed with resources to correctly predict the action of competitors and best respond to their competitors' action. A nonstrategic firm, in contrast, simply randomizes its price over the interval [0, 1] , regardless of its rivals' behavior. 1 Firms' types are assumed to be exogenous.
We begin our analysis by considering the case in which all the firms are strategic. Subsequently, we explore the case in which one firm is nonstrategic and the other (m -1) firms are strategic. Finally, we examine an asymmetric equilibrium outcome in the presence of asymmetric strategic capabilities to assess the robustness of our findings.
Symmetric Strategic Capabilities
When multiple symmetric firms compete on price, there is no symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium (Narasimhan 1988; Varian 1980) . However, the game does have a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium. Let F i (P) denote the price distribution of Firm i. Then, Firm i's objective function is Each firm can earn a by charging the reservation value 1 because all the firm's loyal consumers will purchase its product at that price. Firms do not have an incentive to price below a/(a + b) because it would yield profits less than a despite attracting all the switchers. The following lemma characterizes the equilibrium price and profits of each firm:
Lemma 1: In the symmetric Nash equilibrium, each firm's expected profits are a. Furthermore, the expected price of each firm is 2 :
(1) max E P 1 F P P dF P , j i.
We assume the uniform distribution in the interval [0, 1] because it is the least informative pricing distribution. Moreover, it is consistent with the characterization of low-level thinkers in prior research (Camerer, Ho, and Chong 2004) . Our main results carry through for other distributions. For example, any distribution of the form F(P) = aP + (1 -a)P 2 , where a £ We establish this claim in the Web Appendix. The total industry profits in this symmetric equilibrium are ma, and consumer surplus is 1 -ma. Next, we examine the implications of relaxing the assumption that firms have symmetric strategic capabilities.
Asymmetric Strategic Capabilities
To begin, consider the case in which one firm is nonstrategic while all the other firms are strategic (we analyze the case of multiple nonstrategic firms in the "Extension" section). Assume that Firm 1 is nonstrategic and that it uniformly randomizes its price P 1 between [0, 1]. The (m -1) strategic firms set their prices after taking into account the prices of the nonstrategic firm as well as those of all the competing strategic firms.
From the equilibrium indifference condition of Firm i, we obtain where a/b £ P £ 1, i, j OE {2, …, m} with i ≠ j. Using the indifference condition, we obtain the following symmetric equilibrium pricing strategy:
where P OE [a/b, 1]. The lower bound on a strategic firm's price a/b £ 1 implies that a OE (0, 1/(m + 1)). Furthermore, we have a mass point of size (a/b) 1/(m -2) at the reservation value 1.
The expected price of a strategic firm, denoted by EP * S , is as follows:
The expected price increases in a for a OE (0, 1/(m + 1)). 3 As the strategic firms compete away each other's surplus from the switching segment, they are left with only the profits
Pf P dP, where f P 1 P P 1 m m 1 P 1 P . from the loyal consumers. Thus, the expected profits of a strategic firm are (aP + bP)dP, represents the expected profits when the firm's price is the lowest in the market and the firm captures the entire switching segment. The second term, Ú 1 a/b {aP + bP[1 -F(P)] m -1 }dP, is the nonstrategic firm's expected profits when it is in direct competition with all the strategic firms. It includes the nonstrategic firm's profits from its loyal consumers as well as its profits from the switchers when it is the lowest-priced product. The difference in the expected profits of the nonstrategic firm and those of a strategic firm is given by After analyzing the profit difference and the corresponding price difference, we obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 1a: When a ≥ a*(m), the expected price of strategic firms is higher than that of the nonstrategic firm. Furthermore, a strategic firm's expected profits are lower than those of the nonstrategic firm.
Typically, one would expect a strategic firm to undercut competitors' prices and attract the price-sensitive consumers in a market. This implies that a strategic firm's average price might be lower than the average price of the nonstrategic firm. The first part of Proposition 1a, however, suggests that we would observe the opposite outcome: when the size of the loyal segment is larger than the threshold a*(m), the strategic firm's average price can be higher than that of the nonstrategic firm. To grasp the intuition for this proposition, consider the simple case of three competing firms (m = 3), two strategic and one nonstrategic (Case SSN). 4 In this instance, the two strategic firms' identical pricing distribution has a mass point at the consumers' reservation value 1: 
The intuition for larger values of m carries through. When m = 2 (one strategic player and one nonstrategic player), the model reduces to a singleagent optimization problem (without any strategic interaction between the players). Pr(P = 1) = 1 -F(1) = a/b, which suggests that the presence of a nonstrategic firm gives the two strategic firms an incentive to charge the highest possible price of 1 with a strictly positive probability a/(1 -3a). However, when all the firms are strategic (Case SSS), no firm will charge the consumers' highest willingness to pay with a positive probability. Moreover, the lowest price charged by a strategic firm when one of its competitors is not strategic is higher than that charged when all its competitors are strategic, implying P S (SSN) = a/(1 -3a) > P S (SSS) = a/(1 -2a). In addition, a strategic firm's lower price bound, P S (SSN), increases in a; that is, ∂P S (SSN)/∂a = 1/[(1 -3a) 2 ] > 0. Increased minimum prices of the strategic firms in the presence of a nonstrategic player arise because a larger loyal segment induces the firms to charge a higher average price to reap the benefits of consumer loyalty. Stated differently, the probability of the nonstrategic firm charging a low price is fairly large (e.g., Pr(P N £ 1 ⁄2) = 1 ⁄ 2), which makes it less profitable for the two strategic firms to charge a low price to attract the switchers when the proportion of loyal consumers is sufficiently large.
The second part of Proposition 1a shows that the strategic firms can earn lower profits than their nonstrategic competitor. We note that the difference in the expected profits of a strategic firm and those of the nonstrategic counterpart varies with the fraction of loyal customers, a. When a tends toward 0, the switchers account for almost the entire market, and the two strategic firms aggressively compete for these switchers, resulting in zero profits. When a exceeds zero, the strategic firms start sacrificing profits from switchers to extract increased rent from the loyal consumers by raising their prices. The resulting higher prices benefit the nonstrategic firm because it captures more switchers. When a surpasses .074, the strategic firms cannot improve their profits as rapidly as the nonstrategic firm, implying ∂P S /∂a < ∂P N /∂a if a > .074. This is because higher prices cause the strategic firms to lose the switchers to the nonstrategic firm. As a further increases in size, the strategic firms lose more switchers to the nonstrategic firm, and their profit growth slows down. In particular, the two strategic firms earn lower profits than their nonstrategic opponent when a > .15, and this profit difference is maximized at a ª .22.
To better illustrate this proposition, Figure 1 , Panel A, presents the equilibrium profits as a function of a in a threefirm competition (m = 3), and Panel B shows the corresponding equilibrium profits in a four-firm competition (m = 4). The solid line and the dashed line represent the strategic firm and the nonstrategic firm, respectively. Figure 1 indicates that the nonstrategic firm's expected profits are higher than those of its strategic competitors in the three-(four-) firm competition when a is greater than .15 (.077).
Asymmetric Equilibrium Outcomes
We have presumed in the previous subsections that all the strategic firms are symmetric and that their equilibrium pricing strategies are identical. Moreover, the expected payoff for a strategic firm is a when it competes with the nonstrategic firm and other strategic firms in the symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium. This profit is identical to the profit a firm can obtain by simply charging the reservation price 1. Thus, some strategic players can potentially choose not to compete for the switchers at all. Here, we consider the implications of this possibility. Suppose k strategic firms deviate from the symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium outcome and charge the reservation price 1. 5 Because these firms are not competing for switchers, it becomes optimal for them to charge the reservation price to their respective loyal customers. The remaining (m -k -1) strategic firms along with the nonstrategic firm compete for the switchers. After analyzing the case in which the strategic firms play such asymmetric strategies, we obtain the following result:
Proposition 1b: When the strategic firms adopt asymmetric pricing strategies and a ≥ a**(m), the expected price of all strategic firms is higher than that of the nonstrategic firm. Furthermore, a strategic firm's expected profits are lower than those of the nonstrategic firm.
Consistent with Proposition 1a, Proposition 1b shows that the nonstrategic firm can fare better in the asymmetric equilibrium in which some strategic firms adopt a pure strategy while others adopt a mixed strategy. Next, we consider the intuition behind this result. For the same reasons discussed in the "Symmetric Strategic Capabilities" subsection, there is no pure-strategy equilibrium for the strategic firms that choose to compete for the switchers. The (m -k -1) strategic firms can adopt an identical mixed strategy and earn the same expected payoff of a. The pricing distribution is given by the following indifference condition:
The term [1 -F(P)] m -k -2 gives the probability of a strategic firm beating the prices of the other (m -k -2) strategic firms that are using the mixed-pricing strategy. The resulting cumulative density function and probability density function of the pricing distribution are given by Note that none of the (m -1) strategic firms has an incentive to deviate from this strategy profile because they earn the same expected payoff whether they play the optimal pure strategy P = 1 or play the mixed strategy F(P). Therefore, the profile in which k strategic firms adopt a pure strategy and (m -k -1) strategic firms adopt a mixed strategy constitutes an asymmetric equilibrium outcome. The expected price and profits of a strategic firm that adopts the mixed strategy are as follows: (10) E(P S ** ) = a, for k ≤ m -3.
Next, the expected profits of the nonstrategic firm are given by
On comparing the expected profits of the strategic firm with that of the nonstrategic firm, we note that the nonstrategic ( ) firm can earn more profits when the size of the loyal segment is sufficiently large. Thus, even when allowing some strategic players to play a pure strategy, we obtain results consistent with Proposition 1a.
ALTERNATIVE FORMULATION OF ASYMMETRIC STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES
In the previous section, we examined the symmetric and asymmetric equilibrium when competing players are endowed with asymmetric strategic capabilities. The analyses in that section assume that firms are either completely nonstrategic and randomize their strategies or fully strategic and play the Nash equilibrium. In this section, we relax this assumption and allow for intermediate levels of strategic capabilities. Building on Camerer, Ho, and Chong (2004) , we consider a formulation with four types of players, with each type evidencing a different level of strategic ability. 6 
Overview of Beliefs
Let Firm 0 be the step 0 player that simply randomizes its pricing over the interval [0, 1] . Firm 1 is the step 1 player, which believes that the other three firms are step 0 players and best responds to that belief. Firm 2 is the step 2 player, which believes that each of the three following potential combinations of types is equally likely to occur 7 :
•All its competitors are step 0 players, •Two firms are step 0 players while the remaining firm is a step 1 player, and •One firm is a step 0 player while the other two firms are step 1 players.
Firm 2 then best responds to its belief. 8 Firm 3 is the step 3 player, which believes that each of the following six situations is equally likely:
•All its competitors are step 0 players, •Two firms are step 0 players while the remaining one is a step 1 player, •Two firms are step 0 players while the remaining one is a step 2 player, •One firm is a step 0 player while the other two firms are step 1 players, •One firm is a step 0 player, one firm is a step 1 player, and the other firm is a step 2 player, and •One firm is a step 0 player while the other two firms are step 2 players.
Firm 3 then best responds to its own belief. Thus, firms differ in their strategic capability, but none is necessarily endowed with more information about the distribution of types. 6 The results of a three-player model are qualitatively the same and appear in the Web Appendix.
7 Though we assume an equiprobable distribution of types throughout this section, this assumption is not necessary to obtain our result that nonstrategic (most-strategic) players can earn more (less) profits in the presence of intermediate strategic capabilities.
8 Two points warrant elaboration. First, the assumption that Firm 2 believes all three possibilities are equally likely is made for simplicity and is not critical; we need only that Firm 2 believes that all three scenarios occur with positive probabilities for our results to hold. Second, we assume Firms 2 and 3 believe that there is at least one step 0 firm. If Firm 2 believes that it is possible for all of its competitors to be step-1 players, our results still hold, but for different parameter regions.
Firm Behavior
Let a k denote the proportion of consumers loyal to the step k player and b denote the proportion of switchers in the market so that a 0 + a 1 + a 2 + a 3 + b = 1. Further assume that a k = a. In addition, we assume the regularity condition, 3 ⁄ 20 £ a £ 1 ⁄ 5. 9 This is similar to the parameter ranges specified in the "Symmetric Strategic Capabilities" and "Asymmetric Strategic Capabilities" subsections. Using this nomenclature, the Web Appendix proves the following result:
Proposition 2: In the equilibrium, (a) the prices of all the strategic firms (namely, step 1, step 2, and step 3 players) are higher than the expected price of the nonstrategic firm, and (b) the strategic firms earn lower expected profits than the nonstrategic firm (step 0 player).
Next, we elaborate on the rationale for these outcomes. We begin by discussing each firm's respective pricing problem and the resulting pricing behavior and profits. We then contrast these profits across the firms to ascertain whether and when the nonstrategic firm outperforms the strategic firms.
Firm 1. Firm 1 is the step 1 player and its expected profit EP 1 is given by (12) a ¥ P 1 + b ¥ P 1 ¥ Pr(P 1 < P 0 & P 1 < P 2 & P 1 < P 3 ).
Because Firm 1 believes that the other three firms' prices are uniformly distributed between [0, 1], we have the following:
where (1 -P 1 ) 3 is Firm 1's subjective probability that the other three firms' prices are higher than its own. Maximizing this profit function yields the optimal price P * 1 = 1. In other words, Firm 1's belief that others will set low prices pushes it to focus on its loyal customers and completely concede the switchers to competing firms. Its profits are given by a.
Firm 2. Drawing on its belief about Firm 0 and Firm 1's pricing strategies, we have the following expected profits for Firm 2: (14) EP 1 = a ¥ P 2 + b ¥ P 2 ¥ Pr(P 2 < P 0 & P 2 < P 1 & P 2 < P 3 ).
Then, given its beliefs about the distribution of other types of players, Firm 2's expected profits are given by In this profit function, 1 ⁄3 denotes Firm 2's belief about the probability of a particular distribution of its competitors' types, and the terms after 1 ⁄ 3 give the profits corresponding to that particular set of types. For example, 1 ⁄ 3[aP 2 + bP 2 {P 2 < P 1 }(1 -P 2 )] is Firm 2's expected profit when two of its competitors are step 1 players and one of its rivals is a step 0 player. It follows that Firm 2's best response price is also P * 2 = 1. Like Firm 1, Firm 2's belief also induces the firm to focus on its loyal segment by charging the highest price, earning a profit of a. ⁄ 20 £ a £ 1 ⁄6, Firm 3 will charge a price less than the reservation value to attract the switchers: P * 3 < 1 (for details, see the Web Appendix). Recall that for all values of loyalty under the regularity conditions, Firms 1 and 2 charge a price of 1 and do not compete for switchers. Because Firm 0 randomizes its prices, Firm 3 charges a lower price than Firm 0 with the probability of (1 -P * 3 ). Therefore, Firm 3's expected profits under lower levels of loyalty are given by (17) EP 3 = aP * 3 + bP * 3 (1 -P * 3 ).
The corresponding profits of Firm 1 and Firm 2 are still a. Table 1 summarizes the ordering of firms' prices and expected profits. Because the price of Firms 1 and 2 is the reservation value, their prices are always higher than that of the nonstrategic competitor. Similarly, the most strategic firm, Firm 3, charges either the reservation value of 1 (when a is in the higher end, 
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9 For the complete characterization of equilibrium outcomes in different parameter ranges, see the Web Appendix. Because P * 3 > 1 ⁄ 2, Firm 3 also prices above the expected price of the nonstrategic firm over the entire range of the regularity condition 3 ⁄20 £ a £ 1 ⁄5. Thus, the nonstrategic firm is always more likely to attract switchers than all of its strategic competitors. As a result, Firm 0 earns greater profits than the strategic firms. At the same time, the most strategic Firm 3 does earn more profits than its two less strategic competitors, Firm 1 and Firm 2, when loyalty is in the lower end of the regularity condition range: EP 3 > EP 2 = EP 1 . 10 While the Web Appendix details firm profits over the entire range of a, including outside the regularity conditions, we note one special case of interest when a = 0-that is, the case in which there are no loyal customers in the market. In this instance, the most strategic firms' expected profits are not zero, as one might expect when all firms are competing for consumers who will simply purchase the lowest-priced good. The expected profits are positive for two reasons. First, because Firm 0 randomizes its prices regardless of the value of a, the probability that Firm 0 will charge price 0 is zero even when a = 0. This creates scope for Firm 0 to earn some profits if the other three firms were to charge higher prices. Second, because Firm 1 assumes that its three competitors are nonstrategic firms, it charges a positive price P * 1 = 1 ⁄4. Then, Firm 2 charges ( 1 ⁄4 -), and Firm 3 charges ( 1 ⁄ 4 -2) in equilibrium. Thus, Firm 3 attracts all the switchers more often than the nonstrategic firm, which randomly charges a price between 0 and 1. It then follows that Firm 3 earns more profits than the nonstrategic firm when a = 0: EP 3 (a = 0) = 3 ⁄ 16 > EP 0 (a = 0) = 1 ⁄ 32. Thus, the presence of a nonstrategic firm enables a strategic firm to earn positive profits despite the market being composed of only switchers.
Together, Propositions 1a, 1b, and 2 suggest that in certain situations, more strategic players can earn fewer profits. Next, we examine this possibility in the laboratory.
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
The theoretical analysis predicts that strategic players will charge higher prices and earn lower profits if the size of the loyal segment is sufficiently large (see Proposition 1a-b). This result is based on the assumption that the strategic players have perfect foresight about competitors' actions. However, players' decisions are likely to be guided by simple heuristics (Amaldoss et al. 2008) . Experimental evidence has also suggested that generating a sequence of random numbers is a nontrivial task, and people often fail to do it (Rapoport and Budescu 1992; Wagenaar 1972) . Consequently, it is not clear that players will mix their strategy choices as theory would predict. Thus, we subject the predictions of Proposition 1a-b to an experimental test.
Experimental Parameters
We consider a market composed of three competing stores (m = 3), with two stores, played by participants, being strategic and one store, played by the computer, being nonstrategic. Furthermore, a 1 = a 2 = a 3 = .2, implying that 60% (3 ¥ .2) of the consumers are loyal and buy from their favored firm, whereas 40% of the consumers are switchers who purchase the lowest-priced alternative. The reservation value of the product is 100 for all consumers. Using this experimental setting, we seek answers to the following two key questions:
•Will the strategic players charge a higher price than that of their nonstrategic competitor? In equilibrium, the strategic players should charge 84.7, whereas the nonstrategic player's price should be 50. Experimental results are directionally consistent with this prediction.
•Will the strategic players earn lower expected profits than their nonstrategic competitor? In equilibrium, each strategic player's expected profits are 20, while the corresponding profits of the nonstrategic player are 21.9. With a sufficient number of trials, strategic participants earn lower profits compared with those of a nonstrategic rival.
Participants
Thirty-two undergraduate students were recruited to participate in the study. They were paid a participation fee of $10 and earned an additional monetary reward contingent on their performance. We conducted two experimental sessions, with 16 participants in each group. On average, participants earned $32.50 in the study.
Procedure
Two participants in each trial played the role of a store manager setting prices. Each of these players could simultaneously choose a price between 0 and 100. The computer played the role of the nonstrategic firm by uniformly randomizing the price in the range of 0 to 100. 11 All the participants were informed of the random pricing strategy used by the computer before the start of the game.
After both participants set their prices in each trial of the experiment, the computer displayed the prices of the three stores and the resulting profits for this trial. To help participants understand how profits are related to the relative prices of the three stores, we provided them with five numerical examples before the start of the game, as Table 2 shows. Additional feedback payoffs are revealed with each trial. Because the game involves a mixed-strategy equilibrium, none of the examples constituted an equilibrium. To maximize profits, participants must formulate accurate 10 Outside the parameter range of this section (i.e., when a oe [ 3 ⁄20, 1 ⁄5]), Firm 3 makes the most profits. Firm 1 is always weakly more profitable than Firm 2, while Firm 0 can be better off or worse off than Firm 1. In other words, there is a nonmonotonic relationship between the steps of thinking and a firm's profits (for details, see the Web Appendix).
11 The instructions to participants are available from the authors upon request. beliefs about the likely prices tendered by the other players and then best respond to the beliefs. This is a nontrivial task. To familiarize participants with the structure of the game, we let them play five practice trials without monetary reward. Subsequently, each participant played 100 replications of the stage game for monetary reward. Participants remained anonymous and were not informed about the identity of their competitors in any given trial (e.g., Amaldoss and Jain 2005; Carare, Haruvy, and Prasad 2007; Lim and Ho 2007) . Furthermore, the participants were randomly paired with a different competitor from trial to trial. The random pairing of players over the iterations of the game gave participants an opportunity to learn about the structure of the game and about the population of players over the course of the experiment (without creating scope for building any reputation). At the end of the experiment, participants were paid according to their cumulative earnings, debriefed, and dismissed.
Experimental Results
In this subsection, we begin by reporting the average outcomes from the experiment. Next, we focus on the distribution of prices and learning across trials. Finally, we consider the implications for the profits the participants earned.
Summary findings. Table 3 reports the mean play results across participants and trials from the two experimental sessions. 12 In theory, the two strategic firms' average price should be 84.66. The expected profits of the nonstrategic firm should be 21.93, and expected profits of the strategic firms should be 20. In actuality, participants set lower average prices (76.27 in Group 1 and 70.32 in Group 2) and earned lower average profits (19.01 in Group 1 and 18.09 in Group 2). Due to these lower prices, the nonstrategic player's profits were also lower than that implied by theory (19.27 in Group 1 and 17.55 in Group 2). The average prices participants charged were higher than that of the nonstrategic player (whose average is around 50). The difference in the profits earned by participants compared with that of the nonstrategic player increases with the number of trials players experience. These findings are directionally consistent with theory.
Pricing. Next, we consider pricing across players and trials. The results indicate that players used a mixed-pricing strategy, as predicted by theory, and that prices across trials evidence learning with repetition of and feedback from the game.
The pricing distribution. The means in Table 3 obscure the distribution of the pricing decisions. Accordingly, Figure 2 depicts the (combined) histogram of 32 participants' pricing decisions across trials. 13 The empirical pricing distribution across participants and plays shows a bimodal pattern, with the largest density mass at 100 (the highest price) and a significant density mass around the price of 45. This distribution is qualitatively consistent with our theoretical model's equilibrium pricing distribution; for the parameters used in our experiment, the probability that a strategic player charges the reservation price is a/ [(1 -3a) -1] = .5. 14 Thus, participants in this study seemed to appreciate the profitability of exploiting the loyal consumers by charging the highest price possible. Furthermore, participants also appeared to undercut their rivals' prices from time to time by pricing low, primarily around the price of 45. Qualitatively, participants seemed to be making a trade-off between charging a high price to exploit the loyal customers and setting a low price to attract the switchers.
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JOURNAL OF MARKETING RESEARCH, JUNE 2015 Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. 12 We use the same draw of a random sequence of prices across all trials in both experiments to ensure that differences are not due to random variation in this sequence. 13 Inspection of individual-level pricing distributions suggests that they are consistent with the mixed-pricing pattern we observe in aggregate.
14 The Nash equilibrium model in the "Model and Equilibrium Analysis" section seems to be a better explanation for the experimental data than the CH model in the "Alternative Formulation of Asymmetric Strategic Capabilities" section. In line with a three-firm CH model, steps 1 and 2 will charge the price 1 with probability 1, which is inconsistent with the mixing pattern we observed in the data. Prices across trials. Given the complexity of this game and the resulting optimal mixed-pricing strategy, we expect players to learn slowly over trials and make better decisions in the latest periods of the game. To better understand the trend in prices as the trials proceed, we partitioned prices over the 100 trials into 5 blocks. 15 Each block consists of prices from 20 consecutive trials. Note that each block contains 640 price points on strategic players' (32 participants by 20 trials) and 20 price points on the nonstrategic player's random price sequence. Figure 3 depicts the mean price in each block and the corresponding confidence interval.
The black bars in Figure 3 correspond to participants' prices, and the light gray bars represent the nonstrategic player's price. The figure indicates that participants' prices gradually rose from 65 in the first 20 trials to approximately 78 in the last 20 trials. A two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution functions shows that the strategic players' pricing distributions differ significantly between the first and the second 50 trials (D = .13, p < .0001).
The mean of the prices from the first 50 trials is 70.1, with a standard deviation of 26.6, while that from the second 50 trials is 76.5, with a standard deviation of 25.6. This comparison of pricing distributions observed in the first and second halves of the game suggests that perhaps players are learning through experience to charge a higher price. In particular, the contrast in the prices observed in the last and first blocks of trials is strong: the average price in the last 20 trials, 78.2, is significantly higher than that of the first 20 trials, 65.0 (t(1,278) = 9.16, p < .0001). Overall, the pricing results highlight two points. First, the average prices charged by the strategic players are significantly higher than those of the nonstrategic player throughout the game. The difference is significant in each block of 20 trials (p < .001). This result is qualitatively consistent with the first part of Propositions 1a and 1b, which states that the price of a strategic player, on average, should be higher than that of the nonstrategic player when a is relatively large. Second, as participants gained more experience through the several replications of the game, they increased their prices. Therefore, the price difference between the participants and the nonstrategic player increases with feedback; the increase, however, grows slowly, suggesting that participants take time to learn the optimal plays. The strategy space is continuous; thus, this game is far more complex than the discrete mixed-strategy games investigated in Amaldoss et al. (2000) . The slow learning could perhaps be attributed to this difference in strategy space.
Pricing rule across trials. To further explore the possibility of learning across trials, the Web Appendix presents a descriptive test of how participants' pricing policies evolve between the first and last blocks of 20 trials. Essentially, this test considers how the preceding trial's states-specifically, lag prices-affect the current trial's pricing policies. If consumers are behaving optimally, the pricing policy should be stationary and independent of recent states. However, if consumers are learning about the profit function, how the likelihood of competitive response varies with their own pricing strategy, and so forth, they should update their beliefs by combining their prior beliefs with the data from the most recent trial. This suggests that early on, lag prices matter a great deal in pricing, but later on, as behavior becomes optimal, the lag states carry little or no weight. The test in the Web Appendix builds on this intuition by assessing the weight of past prices in participants' pricing policy function and compares this weight across early and late blocks of trials. The results point to evidence of pricing behavior that is consistent with learning.
Profits. Although Table 3 indicates no significant difference in average profits between the participants and the nonstrategic player over all 100 trials, the previous subsection suggests players do appear to learn. As with prices, we therefore partition 100 trials into 5 consecutive 20-trial blocks to illustrate how profit differences between the strategic and nonstrategic firms change as trials progress. Given the slow rate of learning, none of these profit differences across firms is significant until the last block. Thus, Figure 4 presents the contrast between the initial and final blocks to illustrate how these profit differences between strategic and nonstrategic firms change. Figure 4 indicates that participants' profits weakly increase, but the effect is not significant (t(1,278) = -.84, p < .40 across the two blocks of trials). In contrast, the nonstrategic player's profit is significantly higher in the last 20 trials relative to (1) the first set of trials (t(1,278) = -5.14, p < .0001) and (2) the plays of the participants (t(1,639) = -3.20, p < .0015). Thus, toward the end of the experiment there is evidence that less strategic firms can earn higher returns.
The intuition behind this empirical result stems from the theoretical model articulated in the previous sections. Strategic participants learn to raise prices to exploit their loyal customer base (provided that each firm enjoys a sufficient loyal customer base). However, this strategy helps the nonstrategic player even more because its price becomes stochastically lower than those of the strategic players, thereby attracting more demand from the switching segment 15 We observed similar patterns of the trends when we partitioned the blocks by every 20 trials, every 10 trials, and every 5 trials. Details are available upon request. for the nonstrategic firm. Strikingly, the better decisions made by strategic participants of the experiment benefit their nonstrategic rival more than themselves.
EXTENSION
The "Model and Equilibrium Analysis" section outlines the situation in which one firm is nonstrategic and all the other competing firms are strategic. To assess the robustness of our finding, this section analyzes a model in which multiple nonstrategic firms compete with multiple strategic firms. Moreover, our theoretical and empirical analyses highlight the possibility that a strategic firm could earn less than a nonstrategic firm. This finding might raise the question whether a strategic firm can choose to mimic the actions of the nonstrategic firm and earn more profits. In this section, we explore this issue as well.
Multiple Nonstrategic Firms
Consider an m-firm oligopoly in which two firms are nonstrategic and the other (m -2) firms are strategic. 16 The (m -2) strategic firms set their prices after taking into account the prices of both the two nonstrategic firms and the competing strategic firms. As we have discussed, there is no pure-strategy equilibrium for this game, but there is a mixed-strategy equilibrium. From the equilibrium indifference condition,
we obtain the following symmetric equilibrium pricing strategy:
This distribution is discontinuous between 1 ⁄ 2 and 1. Furthermore, there is a mass point of size (4a/b) 1/(m-3) at the reservation price 1. Notably, a strategic firm charges the highest price possible with a greater probability when the number of nonstrategic firms increases from one to two. The intuition for this is that the incentive for a strategic firm to price more aggressively decreases as the number of nonstrategic firms increases; thus, we observe a rise in the probability of the strategic firm charging the reservation price of 1. 17 The expected price of a strategic firm is given by Furthermore, the expected profits of a strategic firm are EP S = a. Next, the expected price of a nonstrategic firm, denoted by EP N , is 1 ⁄ 2. The expected profits of a nonstrategic firm are
The first term in Equation 22, Ú 1 0 aPdP, represents the profits from the nonstrategic firm's loyal segment. The second term, Ú 0 P bP(1 -P)dP, captures the profits from switchers when the nonstrategic firm's price is lower than the other nonstrategic firm, and it captures the entire switching segment. The third term, Ú P 1/2 bP(1 -P)[1 -F(P)] m -2 dP, is the nonstrategic firm's profits from switchers when it is in direct competition with all the strategic firms and the other nonstrategic firm. The nonstrategic firm appropriates the switching segment when it has the lowest price. The last term, expresses the profits from switchers when the nonstrategic firm's price is lower than the other nonstrategic firm, condi-(22) E PdP P 1 P dP P 1 P 1 F P dP P 1 P dP 4 . 16 Closed-form solutions cannot be obtained for the general case with k nonstrategic firms and (m -k) strategic firms, where k ≥ 3. Yet it can be numerically shown that for given k, m, and a, a nonstrategic firm can earn more profits than a strategic firm. For example, when k = 3, m = 6, and a = .09, a nonstrategic firm earns more profits than a strategic firm. 17 Specifically, when there is only one nonstrategic firm in the m-firm competition, a strategic firm charges the reservation price with probability (a/b) 1/(m -2) (see the "Asymmetric Strategic Capabilities" subsection).
tional on all the strategic firms charging the highest price 1. In particular, is the probability that all the strategic firms are charging the reservation price 1.
In contrast, the strategic firms compete away one another's surplus from the switching segment and are left with only the profits from the loyal customers. Therefore, the expected profits of a strategic firm are EP S = a. The difference in the expected profits of a nonstrategic firm and those of a strategic firm appear in the Web Appendix. Analyzing the profit difference leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 3: When there are two nonstrategic firms in the mfirm oligopoly, the expected price of strategic firms can be higher than that of the nonstrategic firms. Furthermore, a strategic firm's expected profits can still be lower than those of a nonstrategic firm. This result is obtained when a is sufficiently large.
Scope for Mimicking Action
Our model presumes each firm behaves in a manner faithful to its type. In this extension, we allow for the possibility that a strategic firm could instead choose to behave as if it were a nonstrategic firm. This enables us to assess whether a strategic firm, by choosing this mimicking strategy, would still earn lower profits than a nonstrategic firm. Specifically, consider the three-firm competition with one firm being nonstrategic. If both the strategic firms were to mimic the nonstrategic firm's random pricing strategy, all firms' profits are given by This profit is greater than the strategic firm's profits in the equilibrium, a, when a < 1 ⁄ 9. In other words, if both strategic firms coordinate and simultaneously mimic the nonstrategic firm's pricing strategy, they obtain higher profits.
However, this outcome will never occur in equilibrium. If one strategic firm believes that the other strategic firm is going to adopt the uniform pricing strategy, the focal firm will undercut the average price of the two other firms by charging ( 1 ⁄2 -). Undercutting will result in higher profits for the focal strategic firm. The same logic applies to the other strategic firm, and thus both strategic firms end up in the mixed strategy equilibrium characterized by F(P) = 1 -a/(1 -3a)P. This reasoning implies that Proposition 1a holds true regardless of whether information about players' types is private knowledge or common knowledge.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The purpose of this article is to shed light on how asymmetric strategic capabilities affect the pricing strategies and, in turn, the profits of competing firms. To this end, we propose an oligopoly model in which the market comprises two segments of consumers: loyal customers captive to each firm and a price-sensitive segment of customers who switch between firms if the price is low. Our theoretical and empirical analysis lends insights into several issues. First, is it possible for the less strategic players to earn more profits in competition? One might intuit that the strategic firms will undercut their less sophisticated competitors' prices and earn greater profits. Our analysis shows that, with enough loyal customers, a strategic firm's expected price is higher and its expected profits are lower than that of the nonstrategic firm. The difference arises from strategic firms' motivation to raise prices and capitalize on their loyal customers' higher willingness to pay; this action also increases the share of the nonstrategic firm's price-sensitive consumers. With a sufficient number of loyal consumers, the strategic firms' price increases actually provide greater help to the nonstrategic firm than to themselves. Therefore, we observe the superior performance of the nonstrategic firm in the equilibrium.
Our results generalize along several dimensions. First, we consider multiple strategic and nonstrategic firms. In this case, we continue to find that less strategic firms can obtain higher profits. Second, we note that strategic firms will not mimic nonstrategic firms-even if the nonstrategic firm's profits are higher. This means that relaxing the assumption of complete information pertaining to firms' strategic types does not change the results. Third, when the strategic firms adopt asymmetric strategies in the equilibrium, the nonstrategic firm may still outperform its strategic rivals. Fourth, our results extend to several nonuniform continuous pricing distributions as well as a simple hi-lo pricing strategy: a regular price and a sale price (for details, see the Web Appendix). Note that the nonstrategic firm is less responsive to the price cuts made by strategic firms. This lack of responsiveness helps the nonstrategic firm avoid the intense competition that drives strategic firms to charge higher prices and earn lower profits.
Second, what happens in the competition when the difference in strategic thinking is a matter of degree rather than being absolute? Our insights also generalize to this case. This concern is relevant because empirical research has suggested that such differences exist in practice (Goldfarb and Xiao 2011; Goldfarb and Yang 2009) . Following the characterization of types in the CH model (Camerer, Ho, and Chong 2004) , we build on our base model and allow for multiple levels of strategic thinking. In this case, we find that firms that are endowed with greater strategic capability can actually perform worse. Notably, this result stands in stark contrast to Goldfarb and Yang (2009) , who show that increased strategic capabilities lead to better outcomes.
Third, does our model explain actual behavior and outcomes? Because it is difficult to perform a causal test of our model in a field setting, we conducted a laboratory study. The experimental results provide support for our theory in a triopoly setting. Although learning is slow in this complicated game, sophisticated players (participants) charge higher prices and earn lower profits than the nonstrategic player (computer) after a sufficient number of trials.
In summary, our analysis somewhat ironically suggests that capable firms can do worse than incapable ones. Goldfarb and Xiao (2011) show that managers with degrees in economics or business display higher levels of strategic ability, which helps them achieve better results. Because our results suggest that strategic firms can perform more poorly, they suggest the intriguing possibility that management education can sometimes lead to worse outcomes to the extent that it enables firms to behave more strategically. Relatedly, in the context of structural models, such as Goldfarb and Yang (2009) and Goldfarb and Xiao (2011) , future researchers could try to measure how the distribution of types affects firms' profits and consumer welfare. Another potential extension pertains to games of entry in the context of limited strategic capability. A manuscript currently under development (Chen and Turut 2013 ) takes a first step on this dimension and extends our findings to another context. We hope this research stimulates further work on the role of strategic capabilities on market outcomes.
